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股权激励作为激励高管的有效方法,其初衷是为了使经营者与所有者利益趋于一致从而提升公司业绩,但在实际执行过程中高管为了自身利益最大化,普遍采用应计盈余与真实盈余的手段来达到股权激励的条件,完全背离了股权激励的初衷。加强市场监管、适当延长股权等待时长、科学的业绩考核指标是解决股票期权激励契约合理性的未来发展方向;同时还要制定合理的公司治理结构来保障公司的良性发展,如高质量的内部控制、完善的内部监督制度、会计信息可比性和透明度的提升、审计的有效性等,都可以对抑制盈余管理起到有效的作用。
Abstract:As an effective way to incentive senior executives,equity incentive's original purpose is to make the operator and owner convergence of interest to improve company performance. But in the process of actual execution executives are in order to maximize their own interests widely adopted accrued earnings management and real earnings management means to achieve the equity incentive conditions,totally deviated from the original intention of equity incentive. Therefore,how to formulate reasonable equity incentive methods is to curb earnings management turn into the focus of scholars to discuss the problem. According to the papers to strengthen market supervision,extend equity waiting time,scientific performance appraisal indicators is to resolve the future direction on the rationality of stock option incentive contract. Also formulate reasonable corporate governance structure to ensure the benign development of the company,therefore,high quality of internal control,perfect the internal supervision system,accounting information comparability and transparency of ascension,and the effectiveness of the audit can play an effective role in the inhibition of earnings management.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.16546/j.cnki.cn43-1510/f.2016.04.005
中图分类号:F832.51;F272.92;F275
引用信息:
[1]阳震青,郑丽英.上市公司股权激励对盈余管理的影响研究综述[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2016,32(04):33-39.DOI:10.16546/j.cnki.cn43-1510/f.2016.04.005.
基金信息:
国家社科基金“旅游者参与旅游服务价值共创模式研究”(项目编号:13CGL082)、国家社科基金“移动用户生成内容环境下旅游者信息行为分析与我国旅游营销模式创新研究”(项目编号:12CGL061)
2016-05-09
2016
2016-05-31
2016
1
2016-08-15
2016-08-15