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制造业作为国民经济的战略支柱,其高质量发展离不开地方政府内生动力的坚实支撑。2016年增值税“五五分成”改革虽然有效提升了地方发展制造业的积极性,但省、市、县(区)三级税收分配的结构性矛盾尚未化解。其中,县区级“制造业税收分成占比低、涉土类税收留存比例高”的问题尤为突出,导致地方“重地产、轻实业”的发展倾向未能从根本上扭转。立足三级税收分成现有格局,从利益调整核心视角切入,系统剖析税收分成失衡对地方政府产业偏好的深层影响机制。研究提出,在保持中央税收分成比例稳定不变的前提下,通过“制造业税收上减下增、涉土类税收下减上增”的结构性调整,构建激励约束与倒逼引导双重机制。该机制可有效提升县区级制造业税收留存比例,降低地方对土地财政的路径依赖,最终激活地方政府发展制造业的内生动力,实现国家产业升级、地方财力增强与企业创新发展的三方共赢,为制造强国战略落地实施提供坚实有效的制度保障。
Abstract:As a strategic pillar of the national economy,the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry relies heavily on the solid support of local governments' endogenous motivation. Although the 2016 VAT “fifty-fifty sharing” reform has effectively enhanced local governments' enthusiasm for developing manufacturing industries,the structural contradictions in tax revenue allocation among provincial,municipal,and county( district) levels remain unresolved. Particularly prominent is the problem of “a low share of manufacturing tax revenue retained at the county and district levels,coupled with a high retention ratio of land-related taxes,” which has resulted in a persistent development bias favoring real estate over industry that has yet to be fundamentally reversed. Based on the existing pattern of three-tier tax sharing,this study systematically analyzes the deep mechanism through which an unbalanced tax sharing system affects local governments' industrial preferences from the core perspective of interest adjustment. The research proposes that,under the precondition of maintaining a stable central government tax sharing ratio,a structural adjustment of “reducing the share of manufacturing tax revenue at higher levels and increasing it at lower levels,while reducing land-related tax revenue at lower levels and increasing it at higher levels” can establish dual mechanisms of incentive and constraint as well as compulsion and guidance. This mechanism can effectively increase the proportion of manufacturing tax revenue retained at the county and district levels,reduce local path dependence on land finance,and ultimately fully stimulate local governments' endogenous motivation to develop manufacturing industries. This would achieve a triple-win situation encompassing national industrial upgrading,enhanced local financial capacity,and corporate innovation development,thereby providing solid and effective institutional guarantees for the implementation of the strategy to build China into a manufacturing powerhouse.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.16546/j.cnki.cn43-1510/f.2026.03.002
中图分类号:F812.42;F427
引用信息:
[1]吴传毅,魏中发.基于税收杠杆优化的地方政府发展制造业内生动力提升机制探析[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2026,42(03):17-24.DOI:10.16546/j.cnki.cn43-1510/f.2026.03.002.
基金信息:
湖南省社科基金重大委托课题“湖南省治理体系治理能力现代化研究”(项目编号:19WTA15)
2026-06-12
2026-06-12